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Abstract
The probability of a partial or complete break-up of the euro has risen over the
last years. Such an event could create a balance sheet problem for economic
agents, since the redenomination process could introduce significant currency
mismatches  between  the  asset  and  liability  sides.  We  propose  a  new
assessment of this redenomination risk, by country and by main institutional
sector, for two scenarios: a single country exit and a complete break-up. Our
main conclusion is that, even though the problem has to be taken seriously, its
order  of  magnitude  should  not  be  exaggerated.  Only  a  few  sectors  are  at
significant  risk:  public  debts  of  Greece  and  Portugal,  financial  sectors  of
Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg. In particular, the consequences for the non-
financial  private  sector  should  be  manageable.  We  provide  policy
recommendations  aiming  at  limiting  the  risk  ex  ante,  and  mitigating  the
consequences ex post.
1. Introduction
When it was introduced at the turn of the millennium, the euro was widely perceived as
a major achievement for Europe, being both the consequence and the cause of an ever
tighter continental integration. During the first years of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) the apparent  economic  successes,  coupled  with cross-country  convergence  of
several economic indicators,  fueled this sentiment of success. The idea that the single
currency was now “irreversible” had settled in most minds.
A couple of years later, the picture looks dramatically different. The world financial crisis
has revealed imbalances that have led to the sovereign debt crisis and brought the EMU
on  the  verge  of  dislocation.  Member  states  turned  out  to  be  unable  to  devise  a
cooperative  strategy,  forcing  the only  truly  federal  institution—the European Central
Bank  (ECB)—to  reinterpret  its  mandate  by  envisaging  a  massive  intervention  on
sovereign bond markets (the Outright Monetary Transactions program).  Even though
this move has put a temporary halt to the crisis,  it became soon clear that monetary
policy alone could not save the eurozone. Indeed, the austerity policies that became the
1 The authors wish to thank the participants of the EReNSEP and OFCE seminars for their very helpful
comments.
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norm on the continent in 2011 fueled a protracted stagnation, with growth rates that
look bleak in comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom.
The underperformance of the EMU has fueled popular resentment against the euro, now
seen by a growing number of European people as the problem rather than the solution.
Moreover, the possibility of a country exiting the euro became closer than ever in 2015
when  the Greek  banking system was  de facto  cut  off  from central  bank refinancing,
having to shut down for a few days and to impose capital controls during months. On the
political  side,  the  tension  also  reached  a  critical  point  when  Wolfgang  Schäuble
suggested a “5-year humanitarian grexit”, a threat to which the Greek people replied by
rejecting the Eurogroup proposal in the July 2015 referendum, knowingly taking the risk
of a euro exit. Even though the situation is now temporarily stabilized, the underlying
causes of the Greek crisis have not been dealt with, and the “grexit” risk will inevitably
come back to the forefront sooner or later.
The financial community itself seems to be prepared to the possibility of an exit or a
dissolution of the single currency by cutting back on cross-border positions. The weight
of cross-border holdings by monetary financing institutions of debt securities issued by
euro area and EU corporates and sovereigns has diminished from about 60% in 2007 to
40%  in  2015  ;  in  the  meantime,  the  median  degree  of  cross-border  penetration  of
banking  institutions  has  significantly  fallen (ECB,  2016,  graph  S23  and  S27).  The
intellectual mood is also shifting: leading thinkers, such as US economist Joseph Stiglitz
(2016),  or  German  Sociologist  Wolfgang  Steeck  (2015)  are  among  the  most  visible
figures of a wider change of attitude in favor of the dismantlement of the eurozone.
A  country  exiting  from  the  EMU,  or  even  the  dissolution  of  the  single  currency,  is
therefore  no longer  a  theoretical  possibility.   Such an  event  would  obviously  have  a
major  impact  in  a  number  of  dimensions,  economic,  financial  and  political.  On  the
economic  side,  the  most  obvious  consequence  would  be  the  changing  conditions  in
products markets due to the new exchange rates; uncertainty would prevail in the short
run, but in the longer run the possibility of adjusting nominal parities would help with
the unfolding of current account imbalances. There however exists another impact, less
discussed, but potentially more disruptive: the changes in the balance sheet position of
economic  actors,  resulting  from the currency  redenomination  process.  Assessing  the
unfolding of these balance sheet  effects  is crucial,  because they could affect  financial
relations,  investment  and  trade  and,  if  not  adequately  managed,  lead  to  productive
disruption.
Indeed,  the  experience  of  financial  crises  in  emerging  countries  in  the  nineties  has
underscored the vulnerability of these economies to foreign currency debt detained by
private  actors.  In  some  situations,  negative  balance  sheet  effects  could  more  than
countervail the expansionary effects of a currency devaluation. Using a large sample of
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non-G7 countries,  Towbin and Weber (2013) establish that a high level of short term
foreign  debt  results  in  such  a  negative  growth  outcome  in  the  case  of  devaluation.
Similarly, Bebczuk et al. (2006), using a panel of 57 advanced and developing countries,
conclude  that  devaluations  are  contractionary  if  more  than  84%  of  foreign  debt  is
denominated in a foreign currency; moreover, if the economy is partially dollarized, the
negative effect of devaluations is even stronger.
At the micro level, there is however some evidence of opposite tendencies. On a panel of
450 non-financial  Latin American firms, Bleakley and Cowan (2008) show that firms
tend to self-insure themselves by matching the currency denomination of their liabilities
with the exchange rate sensitivity of their profits. As a consequence, after a devaluation,
investment of firms indebted in dollars does not fall more than that of firms indebted in
the domestic currency.
Some authors  have also discussed the importance of  the redenomination  risk in  the
specific case of the euro area. Nordvig and Firoozye (2012, p. 56), for example, argue that
“Balance sheets effects, ex post break-up, are likely to be very large for exiting eurozone
countries” because of the significant external liabilities that would stay denominated in
euros following the exit. The approach of the present paper is methodologically similar
to theirs, in the sense that we also build estimates of relevant liabilities and relevant net
positions  after  a  euro  exit,  using  decomposition  by  institutional  sectors.  There  are
however  important  differences:  first,  our  data  is  more  recent  (2015  versus  2011);
second, for determining the proportion of bonds that are likely to be redenominated, we
use aggregate data provided by the Bank of International Settlements, while Nordvig and
Firoozye (2012) build their own estimates using financial data at the micro level (which
are potentially less complete); third, we estimated expected exchange rate movements
using a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate methodology. The numerical results that
we obtain are broadly consistent with those of Nordvig and Firoozye (2012),  though
there  are  some  specific  sectors  and  countries  for  which  our  estimates  diverge
significantly.  However,  the conclusions that we infer from our analysis  are somewhat
different from theirs, in particular because we go a bit further in the sectoral analysis, by
providing estimates of balance sheet effects at the sectoral level and by discussing the
sectoral-specific ways of dealing with the issue of balance sheet misalignment.
Another  study  by  Amiel  and  Hippolyte  (2015)  specifically  looks  at  the  French  case,
warning  of  the  huge  costs  resulting  from  the  exposure  of  French  firms  to  the
redenomination of liabilities registered under foreign law in the case of the country’s
exit from the euro. Unfortunately, this study suffers from a number of shortcomings and
provides a rather partial  analysis:  it  focuses only on large non-financial  corporations
(excluding  smaller  ones);  on  the  liability  side,  it  looks  only  at  marketable  bonds,
excluding loans; and more importantly, it does not look at the asset side, which could
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provide a significant mitigation buffer. The authors also tend to exaggerate the problem
of devaluation overshooting by considering that it concerns the total stock of debt (and
not only the short  term part of it). However,  we share with them the conclusion that
Nordvig and Firoozye (2012) underestimate the risk on the liability side for the French
non-financial private sector.
In this paper, we propose a new assessment of the redenomination risk in the euro area.
After having disentangled the mechanisms at stake,  we assess  the situation of  cross-
border  financial  interdependencies  for  the eurozone  countries,  evaluate  the  risk and
their distribution, and identify the relevant policies to mitigate these risks. We argue that
it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  various  kinds  of  liabilities  and  between
sectors  in  order  to  address  accurately  the  problem.  Moreover,  we  stress  that  the
potentially  negative  impact  would  not  only  concern  devaluing  countries  but  also
countries  experiencing  a  reevaluation  of  their  currency,  which  would  be  a  strong
incentive  to  cooperate.  Overall,  we  consider  that  policy  discussion  surrounding  an
alternative currency arrangement in Europe must take into account these balance sheet
effects in order to make a euro exit or a break-up manageable, but that the importance of
the problem should not be overestimated either.
2. The conundrum of balance sheet redenomination
The balance sheet impact of a euro exit on countries’ economies depends on the size of
currency  mismatches  that  will  appear  on  balance  sheets  after  the  redenomination
process, on the direction of the exchange rate adjustment of the new domestic currency,
but also on the sectoral distribution of the balance sheet movements.
2.1. The importance of the initial foreign currency mismatch
As a result of the redenomination process in a given exiting country, various assets and
liabilities  that  were  formerly  denominated  in  euros  will  be  converted  into  the  new
domestic currency (see the next sections for a more detailed discussion of this process).
But  some  assets  and  liabilities  will  not,  and  those  balance  sheet  items  will  now  be
counted as foreign currency items, on the same ground as assets or liabilities expressed
in, for example, US dollars or UK pounds.
The exchange  rate  of  the  newly introduced  domestic  currency  will  then be adjusted
relatively to the euro (or to the other European currencies in case of a complete break-
up). The impact of this movement on balance sheets will depend on the direction of this
movement, but also on the size and direction of the currency mismatch that may have
appeared  following  the  redenomination  process.  The  currency  mismatch  can  be
measured by what we call the “initial net foreign currency position,”  i.e. the difference
between  assets  and  liabilities  denominated  in  foreign  currencies  following  the
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redenomination process,  but before the currency movement.  Table  1 summarizes the
balance  sheet  effect—expressed  in  the  domestic  currency  of  the  country  under
consideration—depending on the direction of the currency move and on the sign of the
initial foreign currency position.
A devaluation will negatively impact a balance sheet with a negative initial net foreign
currency position, while it will benefit a sector or a country for whom foreign currency
assets exceed foreign currency liabilities before the currency move. An appreciation of
the  domestic  currency  will  have  opposite  effects,  improving  the  balance  sheet  of  a
sector/country with an initially negative net foreign currency position, and deteriorating
the position of a sector/country with a positive position.
The problem of a negative impact on balance sheets of domestic actors thus concerns
not only a country with a negative net foreign currency position which will devalue, but
also a country with a positive position which would experience an appreciation of its
currency. Note that a negative impact tend to be the general case (though there are some
exceptions),  because  countries  for  which the euro  is  overvalued  (resp.  undervalued)
tend to accumulate foreign liabilities (resp. assets).
At this point, one could wonder how a currency movement could have a negative impact
on all countries. After all, it should amount to a zero-sum game, since the wealth of the
appreciating  countries  increase  as  much  as  the  wealth  of  depreciating  countries
diminishes.  This is of course true when all net worths are expressed in a given third
party  currency,  but  we  are  here  considering  the  impact  of  currency  movements  on
balance  sheets  expressed  in  domestic  currencies.  It  is  perfectly  possible  that  the  net
foreign position of appreciating countries both  increase  when expressed in some third
party currency, and  decrease when expressed in the (appreciating) domestic currency;
our point is that this is precisely the general case.
It  should also be kept in mind that,  even though the  net foreign currency position is
important, it does not summarize all the relevant information. In particular, even if the
aggregate net position is positive (at the national or sectoral level), it may happen that
foreign  currency  assets  are  not  detained  by  the  same  agents  as  those  with  foreign
currency  liabilities.  In  that  case,  the  mitigation  potential  of  assets  in  the  case  of  a
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Table 1: Impact of currency moves on balance sheet 
Initial Net Foreign Currency Position
A > L A < L
Depreciation + −
Appreciation − +
depreciation would be rather limited (unless redistributive policies are put in place). It is
therefore also important to look at gross assets and liabilities in foreign currency.
2.2. Varieties of instruments
All instruments on the balance sheet do not have the same relevance for assessing the
risk following from a euro exit or break-up.
One should first distinguish between liabilities and assets depending on the location of
the counterparty. In most cases, balance sheet items exhibiting a foreign currency risk
have a counterparty that is located abroad. It is therefore natural to begin by looking at
the net foreign position of economic agents, since this concept by definition summarizes
the assets and liabilities which have a non-resident counterparty. There are also a few
balance sheet items denominated in foreign currency whose counterparty is resident;
we discuss these further below.
The various instruments contributing to the net exterior position do not have the same
relevance  for  the  risk  that  we  want  to  assess.  Table  2 summarizes  the  asymmetric
distribution  of  vulnerabilities  and  countervailing  forces  across  the  spectrum  of  the
balance of investment. In green, on the asset side, are all the foreign assets that could
contribute to improving the international position of a balance sheet in conditions of
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Table 2: Criticality of the various instruments for the balance sheet position in the case of a depreciation
EXTERNAL ASSETS EXTERNAL LIABILITIES
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO EQUITY SECURITIES
BONDS (LONG TERM)
LOANS (LONG TERM)
BONDS (SHORT TERM)
LOANS (SHORT TERM)
CROSS-BORDER DEPOSITS
DERIVATIVES
RESERVE ASSETS
NEUTRAL NOT CONSIDERED
POSITIVE NEGATIVE HIGHLY NEGATIVE
financial stress due to currency devaluation. In orange and red, on the liability side are
the instruments that make one sector vulnerable.
Since equity (both direct and portfolio investment) are not financial contracts expressed
in monetary terms,  there is no redenomination issue  per se.  This does not mean that
there  is  no  effect  on  the  balance  sheet  however.  On  the  liability  side,  a  post-exit
devaluation indeed does not change anything, because the accounting valuation does not
depend on the exchange rate. But, on the asset side, investments being written at their
market value, a devaluation increases the latter in terms of the domestic currency. As
these positions could potentially be liquidated, this has a positive impact on the balance
sheet position.
For financial contracts that involve an obligation in monetary terms (like bonds, loans
and deposits), the redenomination process will determine whether they are converted to
the new domestic currency (at a rate fixed by the new monetary law), if they remain in
euros, or are converted to some other currency if the euro disappears.
It is not the purpose of the present paper to analyze and discuss the legal aspects of this
process. We rather rely on existing analyses, in particular Proctor (2011),  Nordvig and
Firoozye (2012, chapter 3 and appendix I) and Amiel and Hyppolite (2015, section III).
The picture that  emerges is that,  for a given contract,  the governing law is the most
important  factor  for  determining the outcome  of  the  redenomination  process.  If  the
contract is under domestic law, it is very likely to be redenominated in the new domestic
currency; on the contrary, if it is governed by foreign law (typically English or New York
law), it will most likely stay denominated in euros (or, in the case of a complete euro
break-up,  it  will  most  likely be  redenominated  into a  new ECU or  into the domestic
currency  of  the  counterparty—in  any  case  a  foreign  currency).  There  are  some
exceptions to this rule, for example in the case where the contract has a provision clearly
tying  it  to  the  currency  of  a  country  distinct  from  the  governing  jurisdiction.  Other
factors,  such  as  whether  the  euro  exit  is  legal  or  not  from  the  point  of  view  of
international law, can also influence the outcome of some specific cases. But the point is
that the governing law is the main determinant, and we will therefore use it in this paper
as a proxy for the likelihood of redenomination.
It is important to understand that, even if a legally valid redenomination followed by a
depreciation  is  a  default  from  an  economic  point  of  view,  it  is  not  so  from  a  legal
perspective.  This  has  important  consequences:  it  means  that,  after  a  lawful
redenomination,  legal  actions  against  debtors  would  fail,  debtors  would  not  be
downgraded to default status by rating agencies, and credit default swaps would not be
activated.
7
The  importance  of  the  governing  jurisdiction  is  illustrated  by  the  Greek  2012
restructuring:  the  new  discounted  bonds  offered  to  foreign  investors  were  emitted
under English law (while retired bonds were under Greek law), so that investors would
have a stronger legal case for asking repayment in euros even after a hypothetical Grexit
and the introduction of a new drachma.
Applying the governing law principle to cross-border deposits in euros,  one sees that
they will end up being denominated in the currency of the bank’s residence. Therefore,
they contribute positively on the asset side and are neutral on the liability side. There
could  be  deposits  denominated  in  some  external  currency  that  will  not  follow  this
pattern, but they represent only a small fraction of the total.
Cross-border loans tend to be governed by foreign law, typically a third-party country
law, both on the liability and on the asset side (though on the latter case there could be
more exceptions). They therefore contribute positively on the asset side, and negatively
on the liability side.
Turning to international bonds, they are most frequently governed by foreign law on the
asset  side  (except  the  rare  case  of  bonds  emitted  by  foreign  companies  under  the
domestic jurisdiction). On the liability side, there is no general rule: domestic entities
emit under both domestic and foreign law, so the breakdown between the two options
has to be empirically assessed.
To  summarize,  only  debt  instruments  could  lead  to  disruptive  evolution  in  cases  of
strong exchange rate devaluation, while the economic actor can rely on a wider range of
assets  to  mitigate  negative  evolutions.  As  noted  by  Frankel  (2005)  in  the  case  of
emerging countries, the key problem is short term debt denominated in foreign currency
(and under foreign law in the euro area): the principal repayment for this category of
liabilities will have to be done in the aftermath of the euro exit, which is likely to be a
chaotic period. In particular, there is a risk of exchange rate devaluation overshooting,
which can make short  term repayments even more difficult.  Moreover,  the mitigation
actions  meant  to  address  the  foreign  currency  debt  problem  (asset  selling,  fiscal  or
monetary policy intervention) may materialize with a delay, and therefore fail to solve
the liquidity problems of agents facing immediate repayment obligations.
Note that we keep derivatives contracts out of our analysis because their opacity and
complexity make it very difficult to disentangle their overall impact, although one can
guess that it will be mainly directed to financial corporations.
Also note that, in the case of currency appreciation, the dynamics is the opposite. The
asset  side of the foreign balance sheet will  deteriorate  across all  positions,  while the
immediate improvement of its liquidity position will materialize only as far as its debt
liabilities  are  reduced.  Consequently,  the  more  direct  negative  balance  sheet  effect
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should  concern  countries  with  a  positive  external  position,  which  face  a  currency
appreciation. Of course, as their point of departure is better, they are less prone to suffer
from disruptive spillovers into a full-blown financial and economic crisis. 
So far we only looked at assets and liabilities whose counterparty is non-resident. But
there are foreign currency-denominated balance sheet items whose counterparty is a
resident agent. The typical case is a public or private bond emission, governed by foreign
law, but purchased at least in part by domestic agents. In the case of the euro exit of a
single country, the domestic holders of the bonds will be entitled to claim repayment in
euros (in the case of a complete euro break-up, since both parties are resident of the
same country, a redenomination into the domestic currency is more likely, though not
warranted). It should however be kept in mind that, if the redenomination process in
this  context  has  a redistributive  impact  across  domestic  agents  (and possibly  across
domestic  sectors),  it  has  no  impact  on  the  aggregate  position  of  the  country.  The
mitigation  of  those  balance  sheet  effects  could  therefore  be  possible  through
redistributive fiscal policies.
2.3. Varieties of sectoral logics
The  socioeconomic  problem  of  balance  sheet  deterioration  differs  considerably
depending on the sector considered. In the case of the public sector, the main issue is the
ability of the state to fund its current activities, which depends mainly on its primary
balance. Indeed, for the state, defaulting is always an option, and any negative evolution
of its balance sheet could lead to a restructuring of its debt which terms would be more
or less favorable, depending on its ability to pay without external funding for its current
expenses.
In the case of the financial sector, unsustainable foreign currency liabilities could cut off
national institutions from financial markets, which would affect domestic activity mainly
through a credit crunch. A mitigation policy to prevent a collapse of domestic activity
would therefore  include bank restructurings,  an  active  monetary  policy  and a credit
expansion by public institutions (see section 7.2 for a more detailed discussion).
The impact of a deterioration of the balance sheet of non-financial firms could be more
directly disruptive, although it could also fuel positive aggregate dynamics on the longer
term. Figure 1 details the mechanisms at stake.
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The first channel is straightforward. A deterioration of one sector’s balance sheet will
lead to higher borrowing costs and deleveraging, with a negative impact on investment.
Spillovers  to  the  broader  economy  will  follow  through  a  direct  short  term  negative
macroeconomic effect in terms of lower demand, fueling recessionary pressure and, on
the  longer  term,  degrading  the  development  path  through  an  obsolescence  of  the
productive apparatus.
The other channel results from the possible default on foreign liabilities resulting from
the deterioration of the balance sheet. Its immediate consequence will be a shortage of
foreign  credits,  leading  to  a  diminishing  of  imports.  The  impact  on  the  domestic
economy is ambiguous. On one hand, the economy could be deprived of crucial inputs,
resulting in a direct contraction of the activity and, indirectly, to an obsolescence of the
productive  apparatus.  However,  it  could  also  fuel  a  substitution  of  foreign  goods  by
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Figure 1: Non-financial sector vulnerability to a currency move with negative balance sheet effects
domestic goods, which could reinvigorate the domestic economy, but which implies an
adaptation of the domestic demand.
These mechanisms point  to four turning points where policies must focus.  First  it  is
crucial  to  mitigate  deleveraging by voluntary monetary  and credit  policy in order  to
resist  the  downward  pressure  on  investment.  The authorities  must  also  identify  the
crucial  foreign  inputs  and  design  adequate  policy  tools  to  guarantee  their  ongoing
provision. On the other hand, industrial policy must be implemented in order to favor
imports  substitution  on  the  supply  side  but  also  on  the  demand  side,  enhancing
sustainable and localized consumption patterns.
3. A look at net international investment positions
A first way to approximate the exposure of balance sheets to the redenomination risk is
to  look  at  international  investment  positions.  Data  on  those  are  available  for  the
economy as a whole,  and for broad institutional  sectors.  They aggregate all  financial
instruments  with  a  non-resident  counterparty,  i.e.  liabilities  of  residents  to  non-
residents, and assets of residents over non-residents.
These statistics are obviously just an approximation of the foreign currency mismatch
that we want to measure. Indeed, as explained above, part of the domestic liabilities to
foreign residents are under domestic law, and are thus not subject to an exchange rate
risk. Conversely, some assets governed by foreign law involve two domestic parties and
therefore do not appear in international investment positions; there is an exchange rate
risk on those assets, which has a redistributive impact across sectors, though it does not
create an aggregate risk at the national level.  These strong limitations being said, the
data on national and sectoral foreign positions are quite instructive.
The data that we use for international investment positions as of Q3 2015 are based on
the balance of payment statistics released by Eurostat,  which for each country offer a
breakdown  both  by  sector  and  instrument.  There  are  however  quite  a  few  missing
figures in the raw Eurostat data, so we filled the gaps by exploiting other sources that
give most of the missing information (World Bank's Quarterly External Debt Statistics,
IMF international investment position data for France, Banca d'Italia, Bank of Finland).
In a few rare cases (sectoral breakdown of foreign direct investment for France, Austria
and Portugal), we had to compute rough estimates by assuming a breakdown similar to
the Eurozone average.
Figure  2 presents  both gross  and net international  investment  positions,  which vary
substantially  across  eurozone  countries.  Countries  are  ordered  from  left  to  right  by
decreasing net position.
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The first striking fact on this graph is the astonishing level of gross assets and liabilities
of Luxembourg, which are both close to 170 times GDP, confirming the country’s singular
status  of  financial  intermediary  and tax heaven.  Medium-sized countries  like  Ireland
and the Netherlands also have very important balance sheets with assets and liabilities
well above 10 times their GDP, due to their status of financial intermediary, and which
suggest a high level of vulnerability to exchange rate adjustments.
Among big countries, there is a clear divide between the periphery (the GIPSI – Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy) plus France which have an overall net negative position,
and the core (Germany,  Belgium, Netherlands)  with an overall  positive position.  This
divide is consistent with the relative positions in terms of current account surpluses and
deficits,  since  external  positions  are  the  stocks  corresponding  to  these  flows
accumulated over the years.2
The  aggregate  statistics  at  the  country  level  mask  an  important  intra-country
heterogeneity across sectors.  Figure  3 shows the breakdown of  the net  international
investment positions across four institutional sectors: general government, central bank,
monetary  financing institutions (MFI henceforth;  mostly banks,  excluding the central
2 Note that valuation effects also enter the dynamics of the international investment position and can
make it diverge from the intertemporal sum of current account surpluses or deficits. See for example
Puppetto and Sode (2012) for an analysis of the valuation effect on a sample of advanced and emerging
countries.
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Figure 2: Overall international investment positions of eurozone countries (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Sources: Eurostat, IMF, World Bank, Banca d'Italia, Bank of Finland, authors' computations
bank), and the other entities (which include households, non-financial firms, and some
financial non-banking firms).
The  external  balance  sheet  of  the  general  government  is  widely  negative  for  most
countries, reflecting the internationalization of public debt markets, with Portugal and
Greece being the more exposed at respectively −83 % and −143 % of GDP. However, as
we shall see later, most of the public debt is emitted under domestic law, protecting it
from the redenomination risk. Greece is an exception, because of the 2012 restructuring,
but for this country a new debt relief  is in any case necessary.
The central bank position is small for most countries. It is only highly negative in the
case of Greece, mostly corresponding to the TARGET2 balance of the country, which is
itself  the  counterparty  of  the  Emerging  Liquidity  Assistance  (ELA)  granted  to  Greek
private banks by the National Bank of Greece.
The  financial  sector  balance  sheets  are  not  distributed  along  a  core-periphery  axis.
Ireland  and  Greece  have  a  net  positive  external  position,  while  the  Dutch  financial
sectors has a strongly negative position. Luxembourg's financial sector external balance
sheet is highly positive at +281%. 
The  “other”  sector  includes  non-financial  actors  (households  and  non-financial
corporations) as well as some financial non-banking actors. It is thus a wide category
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Figure 3: Net international investment position, sectoral breakdown (% of GDP, excl. fin. derivatives, Q3 2015)
Sources: Eurostat, IMF, World Bank, Banca d'Italia, Bank of Finland, authors' computations
that allows for a conservative assessment of the exposure of the real private economy to
the balance sheet redenomination risk.  Figure  3 is remarkable as it stresses the very
limited exposure of peripheral countries to this risk. The balance of the Greek “other”
sector is for example positive at 29% of GDP, while it is only mildly negative for Spain,
Portugal and Ireland at respectively –12%, −16% and –41%. The positions of Germany
and France are more strongly positive (+57% and +41%). Luxembourg has a very high
negative position (−367%) with a huge balance sheet (not on the graph). At the opposite,
we find the Netherlands,  with a highly positive balance of +113%. The huge MFI and
“other” sectors balance sheet comforts the view that tax evasion schemes involving these
last two countries are very important, as documented by the European Commission for
Fiat and Starbucks.3
4. Relevant debt
The previous section presented the international investment positions by country and
by sector, which gives only an approximation of the balance sheet at risk in case of euro
exit.
We now turn to a more accurate assessment of the foreign currency mismatch problem,
beginning with the liability side. As shown on Table 2, only the debt components (loans
and bonds) are at risk. Other components will not be affected by the change of currency,
either  because  they  are  not  directly  expressed  in  monetary  terms  (like  equity),  or
because  they  will  be  redenominated  in  the  new domestic  currency  (like  deposits  in
domestic banks). And among loans and bonds, some will be redenominated in the new
currency,  as explained in section  2.2, depending on their governing law. What we are
interested in is therefore the “relevant debt”, i.e. the sum of the loans and bonds that will
remain in euros (in case of a single country exit) or that will be redenominated in some
other foreign currency (in case of a complete break up).
In  order  to  identify  bonds  that  are  governed  by  foreign  law,  we  use  the  Bank  of
International  Settlements'  (BIS)  debt  securities  statistics.  The  database  distinguishes
bond issues depending on their issue market, domestic or international. Since the 2012
release of that database, bonds that have a foreign governing law are always classified as
international,  though some bonds governed by domestic law can also be classified as
international  (see  Gruić  and  Wooldridge,  2012,  box  2,  p.  70).  In  our  analysis,  we
therefore use international bonds as defined by the BIS as a proxy for foreign law bonds;
since our relevant debt estimates may overstate the true figures, they should therefore
be considered as an upper bound on the currency risk.
3 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm.
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Concerning  loans,  we  make  the assumption that  loans  from  foreign  bank  are  under
foreign law, while law from domestic banks are under domestic law. The World Bank's
Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) provide figures for cross-border loans, with a
breakdown by institutional sector, that we use as a proxy for foreign law loans.
We begin by looking at the relevant  debt of  the general  government sector.  Figure  4
shows the international  bonds emitted by eurozone governments,  with a breakdown
depending on the maturity (since short term bonds are likely to be more problematic, as
discussed in section 2.2). Overall, government bonds do not represent a very high risk,
since international bonds represent 10% or less of GDP for most countries. It is even
almost zero for France.  There are two exceptions: Austria, with about 25% of GDP in
international bonds, and Greece with 15% (mostly English law bonds emitted during the
2012 restructuring). Moreover, short term bonds represent only a small fraction of the
total.
Similarly,  Figure  5 indicates  the  loans  at  risk  for  the  general  government  sector.
Countries  that  undergone  an  adjustment  program  clearly  stand  out  on  that  graph:
Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal  and  Spain,  which  received  loans  from  other  Eurozone
governments, or from institutions like the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
(EFSM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or its successor the European
Stability  Mecanism  (ESM).  In  particular,  external  loans  of  the  Greek  government
represent 126% of the country's GDP, and today constitute the bulk of  Greece's public
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Figure 4: International bonds issued by governments (% of GDP, Q3 2015).
Source: BIS
debt. Again, Austria stands as an exception, since it is the only non-program country with
more than 5% of GDP of external loans.
As mentioned in section 3, one should also look at the central bank positions in order to
get the full picture for the public sector. However, most of the external position of central
banks is related to TARGET2 balances (see appendix  10.2) and to banknotes issuance
(Whittaker, 2011): in both cases, it is difficult to distinguish between a liability and an
asset  side,  and  only  the  net  position  is  available.  We  therefore  cannot  construct  a
relevant debt indicator for central banks, and will only provide a relevant net position
for them in the next section.
Figure 6 presents international bonds emitted by financial corporations (banks and non-
banks alike), both short and long term.4 First, one can see that the relevant debt levels
are  higher  for  financial  corporations  than for  governments:  for  most  countries,  they
represent  between  20% and  40%  of  GDP.  Three  exceptions  stand  out:  Luxembourg,
Ireland  and  the  Netherlands,  which  have  much  higher  levels,  due  to  their  status  of
financial intermediaries. Also note that the share of short term debt tends to be higher
than for governments. In particular, the proportion of short term debt is very high for
Greek banks,  probably due to their perceived riskiness by markets which makes long
term borrowing too expensive for them.
4 We  don't  report  the  corresponding  figures  for  loans,  since  they  are  very  small;  interbank lending
essentially takes the form of security trading. 
16
Figure 5: Cross-border loans of general government (% of GDP, Q3 2015).
Source: World Bank QEDS
Figure  7 reports  the  international  bonds  issued  by  non-financial  corporations.
Luxembourg, where those stand at 25% of GDP, is the usual outlier, suggesting that some
corporations classified as non-financial may also be involved in financial intermediation.
At the other extreme, it is interesting to see that the GIPSI countries are precisely those
where non-financial corporations are the less exposed to foreign law bonds (Germany
being the only other country with a similarly low exposure). Total foreign bonds levels
are also rather small in absolute terms, between 2% and 6% of GDP for those countries.
This may reflect either a structurally smaller financial integration or the fact that the
crisis has engendered a refragmentation of eurozone financial markets; in any case, the
productive sector of the GIPSI countries is not so much vulnerable to a currency shock
via  the  bond  channel.  The  difference  between  Germany  and  France  is  also  striking:
France's non-financial sector is four times more exposed than Germany's to that kind of
shock.
Concerning cross-border loans of non-financial corporations, one faces a difficulty: the
only data available to our knowledge come from the balance of payments statistics (see
Figure  8),  which  aggregate  non-financial  corporations  with  non-banking  financial
corporations,  households,  and  non-profit  private  organizations.  The  inclusion  of
households and non-profit is probably not a big issue since one can reasonably assume
that they don't borrow much abroad; but non-banking financial firms are susceptible to
blur the picture. The statistics that we report are therefore meant to provide an upper
bound  of  the  risk  for  the  non-financial  firms.  Indeed,  Luxembourg,  Ireland  and  the
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Figure 6: International bonds issued by financial corporations (% of GDP, Q3 2015).
Source: BIS
Netherlands appear to be the usual outliers, with very high loans levels, which suggests a
significant  financial  component  in  their  data.  For  the  other  countries,  the  average
exposure is of 10% of GDP, with a significant short term component. France is above the
average, with 14% of GDP, mostly short term: it is impossible to say if this comes from
the high level of financialization of the French economy, or because French non-financial
firms tend to contract  more loans abroad  (as this is the case  for bond issuance,  see
previous section).  Spain is also above the average,  at  13% of  GDP,  but with a longer
maturity.
We conclude this overview of the debt at risk by constructing summary statistics by
sector.  Table  3 gives, for each of the three sectors, the total of the debt at risk and its
short term component.5 Note that, for the reason explained above, the loans of the non-
banking financial corporations are attributed to the non-financial corporations sector, so
the latter figure  is possibly overestimated  (while the financial  sector  risk is possibly
underestimated by the same amount).
5 Note that our relevant debt measures do not include debts classified as foreign direct investment; see
appendix 10.1 for more details on this issue.
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Figure 7: International bonds issued by non-financial corporations (% of GDP, Q3 2015).
Source: BIS
Table 3: Relevant debt by sector (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Sources: BIS, World Bank QEDS, authors' computations
Greece Italy Portugal Spain Ireland France
General
government 142% 8% 57% 12% 35% 2%
incl. short term 3% 1% 1% 0% 2% 0%
Financial
corporations 42% 30% 18% 43% 395% 42%
incl. short term 29% 4% 2% 8% 98% 8%
Non-financial corps.
+ households 13% 18% 20% 15% 312% 33%
incl. short term 5% 8% 8% 4% 53% 17%
Germany Netherlands Austria Luxembourg Belgium Finland
General
government 6% 5% 35% 7% 10% 17%
incl. short term 2% 2% 4% 0% 2% 6%
Financial
corporations 28% 225% 35% 876% 22% 59%
incl. short term 9% 36% 8% 135% 1% 17%
Non-financial corps.
+ households 20% 66% 23% 910% 23% 20%
incl. short term 5% 18% 6% 385% 13% 4%
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Figure 8: Cross-border loans of corporations (excl. MFI) and households (% of GDP, Q3 2015).
Source: World Bank QEDS
5. Relevant net position
The previous section has studied the currency risk on liability side of the balance sheet,
which is the main problem in the case of a devaluation.
However,  the  asset  side may be useful  for  mitigating  the devaluation  problem,  since
assets  in  foreign  currency  will  become  more  valuable  in  the  domestic  currency.
Moreover, in the case of a currency appreciation, it is from the asset side that difficulties
can arise.
In this section we present our estimation of the relevant net position (i.e. the net foreign
currency position as defined in section  2.1) for economies as a whole and by sector.
Figure 9 presents the results as a graph, while Table 4 present them in tabulation form.
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Figure 9: Relevant net position (% of GDP, excl. fin. derivatives, Q3 2015)
Sources: Eurostat, IMF, BIS, World Bank, Banca d'Italia, Bank of Finland, authors' computations
Table 4: Relevant net position (% of GDP, excl. fin. derivatives, Q3 2015)
Sources: Eurostat, IMF, BIS, World Bank, Banca d'Italia, Bank of Finland, authors' computations
Greece Italy Portugal Spain Ireland France
General gov’t -140% −1% −50% −8% −30% 4%
Central bank -51% −1% −1% −9% 0% 5%
MFI 10% 3% 28% 15% 204% 51%
Other 32% 29% 23% −7% 428% 44%
Total -149% 30% 0% −9% 601% 103%
Germany Netherlands Austria Luxembourg Belgium Finland
General gov’t 4% 0% −29% 23% −6% 46%
Central bank 10% 17% 10% 77% 12% 19%
MFI 50% 31% 41% 1338% 100% 60%
Other 47% 35% 42% 5363% 109% 12%
Total 111% 83% 64% 6801% 215% 137%
On the asset  side,  all  components of  the international  investment position have been
included, with the exception of the foreign direct investment:6 we consider that, because
of its strong illiquidity, the mitigation potential  of that class of  asset  is too low to be
relevant. On the liability side, we use the relevant debt concept presented in the previous
section. The net relevant position is the difference between the relevant assets and the
relevant debt.7 A negative (resp. positive) position indicates an exposition to a nominal
depreciation (resp. appreciation) risk.
Note  that  the  sectoral  breakdown  is  the  same  as  for  the  international  investment
position figures of section  3. In particular, the “other” sector includes the non-banking
financial  sector;  this  means  that  on  the  liability  side  we  do  not  follow  the  same
convention as in the previous section, for consistency with the asset side.
6 As shown on Table  2, all assets components of the international investment position are sensitive to
currency movements. Note that in addition to FDI, we also exclude financial derivatives, because of the
difficulty in interpreting the data.
7 Note that there is no inconsistency of treatment between the liability side and the asset side. As a first
example,  consider an ESM loan granted to some periphery country. From the point of  view of  that
periphery country, it is clearly a foreign currency debt. But from the point of view of creditor countries,
it is also a foreign currency asset,  because upon their exit from the euro zone the loan would remain
denominated in euros (or in the equivalent of the ECU in case of  complete break up).  As a second
example, consider a bond emitted by a French firm under foreign law (typically English or New-York
law)  and detained by  a  German entity.  From the point  of  view of  France,  this  is  clearly  a foreign
currency liability, both in case of French exit or complete break-up (in the latter case, redenomination
is unlikely to be in Francs). From the German perspective, in case of a German exit, the bond would
remain in euros and it is correct to count it as a foreign currency asset. The situation is a little more
complex in the case of a complete break-up: it should also be redenominated in the equivalent of the
ECU but there is a higher degree of juridical uncertainty, as a court could decide to redenominate it in
Deutschmarks  (though  other  options  are  also  possible,  like  UK pounds,  US  dollars  or  a  basket  of
currencies); counting it as a foreign currency could not be correct in that case.
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The most striking fact that emerges from the analysis is that the relevant net position is
positive  for  all  countries  in  aggregate,  the  only  exceptions  being  Greece  and  Spain.
Moreover, the sectors representing the private sector (MFI and “other”) are also always
in positive territory, with the exception of the “other” sector in Spain. On the government
side, Greece and Portugal exhibit a very negative position, while Austria and Ireland have
a mildly negative one.
This results indicates that for those countries that are likely to experience a post-euro
devaluation,  i.e. the GIPSI and France, there is no aggregate balance sheet risk for the
private sector (except for Spain), and even no risk for the public sector in some cases.
This does not mean that there is no problem, because the holders of the sensitive assets
may not be the same as those of the sensitive liabilities, but at least there is room for
maneuver.
Conversely,  the  significantly  positive  position  of  those  countries  that  are  likely  to
experience a post-euro appreciation (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria) indicates that
they are also at risk. Their assets accumulated abroad would lose part of their value if
they  were  to  abandon  the  single  currency.  This  means  that  countries  which  have  a
weight significant enough to endanger the EMU if they were to leave, like France, Spain
or Italy, have a bargaining power that is much greater than what a superficial current
account analysis may suggest.
6. A composite risk index
So far we have analyzed the balance sheet risk by first focusing on the liability side (both
short and long term), and then by looking at the total balance sheet subject to a post-
euro currency risk.
In this section, we construct a composite risk index that synthesizes all these dimensions
of the problem into a single indicator.  Indeed, as mentioned before,  both the relevant
debt and the relevant position matter: the former is the most acute issue for countries
undergoing a depreciation, while the latter can help to mitigate the debt problem, and at
the  same  time  constitutes  the  problem  for  countries  undergoing  an  appreciation.
Moreover, we have seen that the short term component of the relevant debt is the most
problematic one, and should therefore be overweighted in the composite risk index. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  direction  of  the  exchange  rate  adjustment  (depreciation  or
appreciation) is central for assessing the nature of the country and sectoral risk. But one
also  needs  to  know  the  expected  magnitude  of  that  adjustment  for  a  more  precise
analysis. Exchange rate movements are particularly hard to foresee—and even more so
in the context of an unprecedented event like a euro exit; it nevertheless makes sense to
rely on estimates of equilibrium exchange rates since, by construction, those reflect the
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most likely outcomes of the currency floating process,  once overshooting effects have
vanished.
Table  5 presents  the  exchange  rate  adjustment  hypotheses  upon  which  our  risk
assessment  is based.  The numbers are derived from the analysis  of  the internal  and
external imbalances of the eurozone presented in iAGS (2015, pp. 96-101). Following a
fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) approach8, these estimates correspond
to the required value added price adjustments within the eurozone if countries are to
reach both their external equilibrium (a current account that stabilizes the international
investment position) and their internal one (closed output gaps). But those adjustments
within the EMU can also be reinterpreted as exchange rate adjustments in a floating
regime (under the hypothesis of fixed internal value added prices).
The numbers that we report in Table  5 correspond to the adjustments  relative to the
euro area weighted average. As a consequence, this means that the numbers can be used
for the two scenarios that we analyze in this paper: in the case of a single country exiting
the EMU (in which case the number corresponds to the expected movement of the new
currency relatively to the euro), and in the case of the complete break-up.9
8 The methodology used in iAGS (2015) for computing FEERs bears some resemblance to Jeong  et al.
(2010).  The exports  and imports  volume and price  equations are  very similar.  There are  however
important differences. First,  the current account objectives differ: in iAGS (2015), the objective is the
current account that stabilizes the net international investment position at a 20 years horizon above a
threshold  of  −35%  of  GDP.  Second,  these  estimates  do  not  rely  on  national  models  for  European
countries, but instead on a multinational model that includes the 11 largest countries of the euro area.
Finally, the rest of the world is not disaggregated and is considered as one block.
9 In the complete break-up case, we are implicitly assuming that the the currency composition of the
post-euro balance sheets will reflect the weights of eurozone countries ( i.e. that the foreign currency
components of the balance sheets of all countries will consist of 30% of Deutschmarks, 22% of French
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Table 5: Hypotheses for post-euro currency movements
Source: iAGS (2015) and authors' computations
Country Exchange rate
adjustment
Belgium −17%
Germany +14%
Ireland −6%
Greece −38%
Spain −10%
France −11%
Italy +1%
Luxembourg +14%
Netherlands +15%
Austria +15%
Portugal −14%
Finland −18%
According to these estimates, Greece still needs a very significant depreciation since the
observed current account improvement is mostly artificial, relying on internal demand
compression and underutilization of the productive potential. Other southern countries
(Spain and Portugal) as well as France need a milder devaluation, while Germany, the
Netherlands  and  Austria  should  undergo  an  appreciation.  More  surprisingly,  Italy  is
neither undervalued nor overvalued with this methodology,  owing to the fact that its
structural  current  account  is  close  to  equilibrium  and  that  its  net  international
investment position is only mildly negative.
The adjustments presented above correspond to the misalignments before the euro exit.
But  one  could  argue  that  inflation  rates  could  diverge  following  the  exit,  therefore
creating an additional exchange rate drift  over time. We however do not include this
dimension in our computations, because our baseline scenario is that, after the shaky
period of the break-up, a new monetary arrangement would be found that would include
exchange rate targets. Moreover, it should be noted that a break-up could actually induce
a convergence rather than a divergence of inflation rates: there is currently a substantial
heterogeneity of inflation rates across eurozone countries, precisely because there is a
single monetary policy that does not fit all.
One  could  also  argue  that  the  adjustments  presented  here  correspond  to  long term
targets, and that there may be overshooting which is not taken into account. Since it is
very difficult to quantify the risk of overshooting and to forecast the dynamic path of the
exchange rate adjustment, our strategy instead consists in overweighting the short term
debt component in our risk analysis, as explained below.
Multiplying the exchange rate adjustments with the estimates of the relevant debt (or
net position),  one obtains the expected aggregate balance sheet movements after the
euro exit.
For each of the three indicators, and for each of the sectors under consideration (public,
financial  corporations,  non-financial  corporations),  we  construct  a  qualitative  risk
measure based on thresholds. For the short term debt, the risk is considered to be high
(resp. medium, low) if the expected post-euro increase is more than 2% of GDP (resp.
1%, 0%). And of course there is no risk if the short term debt decreases after the exit
(case of an appreciation).
Similarly, the thresholds for the movements in total relevant debt are the following: high
risk above 10% of GDP; medium risk between 5% and 10%; low risk between 0% and
Francs, 16% of Italian Lira…). This is of course a simplifying assumption, but we do not have enough
data to refine this computation. Moreover, for the two scenarios, we are also making the assumption
that  the  non-euro currencies  (US dollar,  UK pound,  yen…) do  not  move  relatively  to  the euro  (or
relatively to the weighted average of the new currencies in the break-up case).
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5% (and no risk if appreciation). The thresholds for the relevant net position are the
same as for the total debt movements, but with the opposite signs.
Finally,  we  construct  what  is  essentially  the  average  risk  measure  across  the  three
indicators (see appendix 10.3 for more details). The results are shown in Table 6, which
should be considered as a qualitative summary of the material presented in this paper.
The table highlights five sectors whose balance sheet will suffer from a strong negative
impact in case of a euro exit: Greece's public sector, for which a large debt restructuring
seems inevitable; the financial sectors of Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg; and the non-
financial sector of Luxembourg. Serial defaults and bankruptcies are highly probable in
those sectors, and strong policy action is called for (see next section).
Three other sectors are also at significant risk, though at a slightly lesser level: Portugal's
public sector, which would probably have to default on its EFSF/EFSM loans; Finland's
financial sector; and Ireland non-financial sector.
It should be noted here that the assessed risk levels of Ireland's and Luxembourg's non-
financial sector may be exaggerated due to the data limitations discussed in section  4:
cross-border  loans  of  non-banking  financial  corporations  are  attributed  to  the  non-
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Table 6: Composite risk index (Q3 2015)
Source: authors' computations
Financial corporations
Austria 0 1 1
Belgium 1 0 1
Finland 0 2 1
France 0 0 1
Germany 0 1 1
Greece 3 3 1
Ireland 1 3 2
Italy 0 0 0
Luxembourg 1 3 3
Netherlands 0 0 1
Portugal 2 1 1
Spain 1 1 1
Legend:
No risk Medium risk
Low risk High risk
General government + 
central bank
Non-financial corps. + 
households
financial   sector,  and this may bias the risk upward given the high financialization of
these countries.
The most striking result  of  our  analysis  is that  the risk for  the non-financial  private
sector is low for most countries (and maybe even for all of them given the last remark).
There will therefore be a negative aggregate impact on balance sheets for productive
firms and for households,  but  it  should be of  a  size small  enough to be manageable
without significant disruptions, assuming that the appropriate policy measures are put
in place.
The case  of  Italy  is  a  bit  special:  since  our  estimate  for  the  expected  exchange  rate
movement  is  almost  zero  (see  Table  5),  our  risk  index  indicates  no  risk  at  all,  by
construction. If one instead assumes a 15% depreciation of the new Lira, then the risk
level becomes “low” for all three sectors (same as Spain).
7. Policy recommendations
In this section, we discuss the policy measures that could be implemented to limit the
balance sheet risks posed by a euro exit, both from an ex ante and an ex post perspective.
Of course we do not claim to provide a definitive and detailed guide to solving all the
problems  posed  by  this  issue,  independently  of  the  country  and  sector.  We  rather
provide an outline of relevant policy orientations, which will have to be translated into
practical measures tailored to the specific situation at hand.
7.1. Ex ante limitation of exposure
Given the mounting uncertainty over the viability of the EMU, it may be wise planning to
limit  the  exposure  of  agents  to  financial  assets  and  liabilities  that,  despite  being
denominated in euros, present a currency risk in case of a break up.
It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  to  some  extent,  the  eurozone  crisis  has  endogenously
produced such a diminishing of risk exposure by reducing cross border liabilities (ECB,
2016, graph S23-S27). Since net financial flows coming from the core have diminished,
this mechanically  translates  into a reduction (or at  least  a  limitation)  of  the balance
sheet at risk, both from the perspective of core and periphery countries. 
The  first  best  solution  for  further  diminishing  cross-country  exposures  would  be  a
rebalancing of trade and financial  flows within the EMU. Indeed, external  imbalances
today  remain  at  very  high  levels,  with  core  countries  displaying  very  large  current
account surpluses. The deficits of periphery countries have admittedly shrunk, but this is
largely the consequence of deflationary policies that have slashed internal demand; the
problem is thus largely unsolved, since demand—and external deficits—will rise again if
these countries are finally  given a chance to recover.  The right solution to this  issue
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would  consist  in  implementing  reflationary  policies  in  Germany  (and  other  core
countries),  in  order  to  reduce  the  competitiveness  differential  between  core  and
periphery, without imposing destructive austerity policies in the periphery. But such a
strategy would take time to bear fruit, and is anyways unlikely to materialize given the
political equilibria at the scale of the continent (Lapavitsas and Flassbeck, 2015).
Another risk mitigation policy would consist in discouraging the exposure of firms to
international  debt  markets  and  foreign  banks,  and  symmetrically  in  encouraging
domestic savers to buy domestic securities. For a given level of external imbalances, such
a move does not have the potential to alter the relevant net position, but it can diminish
gross positions and in particular the relevant debt levels. However, this strategy amounts
to a deliberate increase in the fragmentation of financial markets within the eurozone,
and is therefore  somewhat  contradictory with the purpose of  a single currency,  as it
implies some restrictions on capital movements.
A  last  strategy,  of  an  uncooperative  nature,  would  be  to  alter  the  governing  law  of
financial assets, without changing the net nor the gross financial ties between countries.
Concretely,  for  a  government  or  a  corporation  of  the  periphery,  this  means  emitting
bonds under domestic  law instead  of  foreign law.  Or for  a  bank of  the periphery,  to
attract  deposits  from households  of  the core,  instead of  borrowing on the interbank
market from banks of the core. In both cases, some higher interest rates would have to
be paid to compensate for the devaluation risk. However,  as the example of the Greek
restructuring showed, changes in governing law tend to go in the opposite direction, in
order to increase investors protection against sovereign risk.
7.2. Ex post impact limitation
The  moment  a  country  decides  that  the  euro  is  no  longer  its  official  currency,  the
redenomination process starts. It is crucial for this process to be as fast as possible, in
order to minimize the uncertainty in the economy. A clearly defined legal framework is
crucial, because it diminishes the number of cases that will have to be settled by a court.
In particular, in the case of a complete euro break up, a European Union directive should
ideally  be  passed  to  facilitate  the  settling  of  complex  cases,  possibly  through  the
introduction of a new accounting currency similar to the former ECU10; see Nordvig and
Firoozye (2012) for a thorough review of these legal dimensions.
The next challenge is for the country to stabilize the exchange rate of the new currency,
and  to  avoid  any  overshooting,  i.e.  a  depreciation  (or  appreciation)  beyond  what  is
required for the long term external equilibrium. As shown by Cavallo et al. (2005), there
is  a  significant  risk  of  overshooting  for  countries  abandoning  a  fixed  exchange  rate
10 As long as the United Kingdom remains in the European Union, such a directive can also help with the
redenomination of English law contracts and bonds. However, the pending Brexit will soon undermine
this possibility.
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regime, especially if their level of external debt is high. In order to avoid or to limit as
much as possible this risk, the central bank should announce its new parity objective
and its willingness  to  defend it.  This  will  of  course  be easier  to  achieve if  there  are
cooperative  arrangements  with other  central  banks  (the ECB or  the national  central
banks).  It may also be necessary to introduce temporary capital  controls  for limiting
speculative movements and capital flights.
Even if the exchange rate is kept under reasonable control, some economic agents will
come under liquidity stress due to higher short term debt repayments,  because their
access to external finance is cut due to their balance sheet degradation, or because the
financial system itself is in crisis. Continuity of access to liquidity should be ensured by
pursuing an expansive monetary policy (though that may potentially conflict with the
exchange rate objective for periphery countries). Moreover the domestic banking system
could be compelled to fund to some extent public finances. Ensuring liquidity access for
non-financial corporations is the most critical point. Part of the task can be done through
the usual transmission channel, that is the banking system. But even in the context of
monetary easing, private banks may be reluctant to lend to domestic firms which have a
degraded balance sheet. Public intervention is therefore warranted, either in the form of
some incentive mechanism to ensure that banks lend adequately, or by mobilizing public
investment  banks  and  giving  them  special  directives  for  organizing  an  emergency
lending  to  firms  negatively  affected  by  the  new  exchange  rate.  In  particular,  firms
importing crucial inputs should be given a priority access to hard foreign currencies.
It may also happen that the financial system itself be in trouble due to its own balance
sheet  problems,  in  which  case  liquidity  access  could  be  endangered  for  the  whole
economy,  and  not  only  those  firms directly  affected  by  the new external  conditions.
Failed banks should in that case be quickly restructured: either by splitting them along a
good bank / bad scheme if possible, otherwise by nationalizing them, in which case that
could facilitate the providing of emergency liquidity to the rest of the economy.
If  liquidity is the short  term priority, solvency problems have to be dealt with in the
longer run. We have already briefly discussed the case of failed banks. For governments
(most likely Greece and Portugal according to our analysis), a debt restructuring process
seems  to  be  the  only  option.  The  negotiation  with  creditors  (which  are  essentially
European  states  and  institutions)  can  create  the  opportunity  to  ask  for  a  monetary
cooperation agreement, in exchange for a partial reimbursement; in the worst case, an
outright default is always possible, though that means relying on domestic financing for
some time, typically two years (Gelos et al., 2011).
For non-financial corporations, default can be an option in some cases. But most often, it
should better be avoided, especially for exporting firms, which could face retaliation on
foreign markets (and firms exposed to foreign currency risks tend to be precisely those
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which are internationalized). We have seen that, on aggregate, the balance sheet risk is
relatively low for the non-financial sector: this means that a number of firms should be
able  to  absorb  the  shock  without  help.  Moreover,  as  shown  by  our  net  positions
calculations  (Table  4 and  Figure  9),  there  is  room  for  redistribution  in  periphery
countries (except Spain) between winners and losers; that may however turn out to be
difficult to implement in practice. Another possibility for the most strategic sectors is to
have  a  direct  injection  of  public  capital;  incidentally,  this  offers  an  opportunity  for
industrial policy.
In core countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria), though there is no debt issue, the
aggregate net position of the non-financial private sector will deteriorate, because there
is a large stock of foreign assets. This problem most likely concerns households (possibly
through pension and mutual funds), so one could worry about the negative impact on
consumption  via  the  wealth  effect  (though  our  data  are  insufficient  to  validate  that
hypothesis).  This  calls  for  a  government  spending  and  investment  plan,  which  is
anyways needed in those countries to absorb their excess savings.
8. Conclusion
This  paper  has  tried  to  assess  the  balance  sheet  effects  of  a  hypothetical  euro  exit,
looking at the twelve historical members of the eurozone, both from an aggregate and
sectoral perspective.
The broad conclusion that we draw from this analysis is that, even though the problem
of balance sheets is real and should be taken seriously, its order of magnitude is not as
large as some claim. Especially in the non-financial private sector, the issue should be
manageable  provided that  proper  policy measures  are  implemented,  and disruptions
should in that case be limited.
We have however identified a few specific vulnerabilities: the public debts of Greece and
Portugal,  for  which a substantial  restructuring  or  even a default  would be the likely
outcome; the financial sectors of Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and potentially Finland,
which would have to undergo a deep restructuring;  and potentially the non-financial
sector of Ireland and Luxembourg, though that latter result may be an artifact caused by
our data limitations.
Assessing the costs of a euro exit obviously matters for properly dealing ex post with the
event, if it were to materialize because of some unexpected political or economic shock.
But  this  assessment  is  also  interesting  from  an  ex  ante perspective,  especially  for  a
country which is considering whether to leave or to stay and is performing a cost-benefit
analysis.  From  that  perspective,  it  is  important  to  remember  that,  for  periphery
countries, staying in the eurozone also leads to a negative balance sheet effect, because
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of the debt deflation strategy imposed by creditors. This is most evident in the case of
Greece, whose public debt to GDP ratio continues to rise through the denominator effect,
as growth and inflation head down.
Even though this study has shed light on some critical dimensions of the issue at stake,
more work could be done to refine the analysis.  In particular,  we did not perform an
estimation of  the cross-country  spillover  effects  of  possible  defaults;  this  is  however
made difficult by the large uncertainty that surrounds the policy implemented after the
exit. Another critical dimension still to be investigated is the risk heterogeneity within
sectors: even if the net sectoral balance sheet effect is small, are relevant assets detained
by  the  same  agents  as  relevant  liabilities?  The  answer  to  this  question  significantly
affects the relevant policy responses.
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10.Appendix
10.1. Debts classified as foreign direct investment
Intra-company  lending  across  borders  is  classified  by  statisticians  as  foreign  direct
investment. It corresponds to a situation where a parent company lends to or borrows
from a subsidiary, or when a subsidiary lends to another one. Figure  10 presents the
stocks  of  FDI  debt  and  its  decomposition  depending  on  the  direction  of  the  intra-
company financial flow.
Outstanding  amounts  are  very  large  for  the  usual  outliers  (Ireland,  Netherlands,
Luxembourg), and are typically between 10% and 20% of GDP for most countries.
We however do not include those amounts in our relevant debt measure (nor do we
include them in our relevant net position, since we exclude FDI from it). The rationale is
the following: an exchange rate movement affecting the currency in which the loan is
denominated corresponds to an intra-company redistribution. We therefore make the
assumption that such a shock will be easily absorbed by the company, if needed through
a partial debt cancellation that neutralizes the effect of the currency move.
10.2. TARGET2 balances
Figure 11 presents the TARGET2 balances of the twelve countries as of Q3 2015. To put it
simply,  TARGET2  balances  play  the  same  role  within  the  EMU  as  foreign  exchange
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Figure 10: Debts classified as FDI (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Source: World Bank QEDS
reserves play in a fixed exchange rate regime (Cecchetti  et al., 2012). They move every
time a current account operation is not matched by a capital operation.
Technically, those balances represent a claim or a liability of national central banks on/to
the Eurosystem as a whole.
In  the  case  of  Greece,  the  TARGET2  claim  is  more  or  less  the  counterparty  of  the
Emergence Liquidity Assistance (ELA): since banks in other countries are not willing to
lend to Greek banks to compensate for capital  flights,  the financing gap of the Greek
banking system is filled through the intervention of the National Bank of Greece, which
itself grows a liability to the ECB.
It  is therefore  clear  that  TARGET2 balances  correspond  to  claims between sovereign
states, that are distinct from official public debt figures. For example, if Greece were to
leave  the  EMU,  its  TARGET2  liability  would  have  to  be  settled  with  other  eurozone
countries, in addition to the existing bilateral, EFSF and ESM loans.
10.3. Risk index components
Table 7 presents the variation of total debt for each sector following the euro exit. It is
the arithmetic product of the relevant debt (Table 3) with the (opposite of the) exchange
rate variation (Table 5). A positive number therefore indicates an increase in total debt.
Similarly, Table 8 indicates the variation of the short term component.
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Figure 11: TARGET2 balances (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Source: ECB
Table 8: Short term debt variation following euro exit (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Source: authors' calculations
Central bank +
government sector Financial corporations
Non-financial corps. +
households
Austria −0,7% −1,2% −1,0%
Belgium +0,3% +0,2% +2,1%
Finland +1,1% +3,2% +0,8%
France −0,0% +0,9% +2,0%
Germany −0,2% −1,2% −0,7%
Greece +1,3% +11,0% +1,9%
Ireland +0,1% +5,6% +3,0%
Italy −0,0% −0,0% −0,0%
Luxembourg −0,0% −18,2% −52,1%
Netherlands −0,3% −5,3% −2,6%
Portugal +0,1% +0,2% +1,2%
Spain −0,0% +0,9% +0,4%
Table 9 presents the variation of the total net worth for each sector following the euro
exit. It is the arithmetic product of the relevant net position (Table 4) with the (opposite
of  the)  exchange  rate  variation  (Table  5).  A  positive  number  therefore  indicates  an
improvement of the balance sheet.
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Table 7: Total debt variation following euro exit (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Source: authors' calculations
Central bank +
government sector
Financial corporations Non-financial corps. +
households
Austria −5,4% −5,3% −3,6%
Belgium +1,6% +3,7% +3,7%
Finland +3,1% +10,9% +3,7%
France +0,3% +4,7% +3,7%
Germany −0,8% −3,8% −2,7%
Greece +54,1% +16,2% +5,1%
Ireland +2,0% +22,8% +18,0%
Italy −0,1% −0,2% −0,1%
Luxembourg −0,9% −118,5% −123,0%
Netherlands −0,7% −33,0% −9,7%
Portugal +8,0% +2,6% +2,9%
Spain +1,3% +4,5% +1,6%
Table 9: Net worth variation following euro exit (% of GDP, Q3 2015)
Source: authors' calculations
Central bank +
government sector
Financial corporations Non-financial corps. +
households
Austria +3,0% −6,3% −6,5%
Belgium +1,1% +16,5% +18,0%
Finland +12,0% +11,2% +2,1%
France +1,0% +5,7% +4,9%
Germany −1,9% −6,7% −6,3%
Greece −72,8% +3,7% +12,3%
Ireland −1,7% +11,8% +24,7%
Italy +0,0% +0,0% −0,2%
Luxembourg −13,6% −181,0% −725,4%
Netherlands −2,4% −4,6% −5,1%
Portugal −7,2% +3,9% +3,2%
Spain −1,8% +1,6% −0,8%
For each country and sector, a total score is attributed on the basis of these figures. It is
constructed by summing the three per-component scores:
• for the variation of total debt: 0 point if negative variation; 1 point between 0%
and 5%; 2 points  between  5% and 10%; 3  points between  10% and 25%; 4
points between 25% and 50%; 5 points above 50%;
• for the variation of short term debt: 0 point if negative variation; 1 point between
0% and 1%; 2 points between 1% and 2%; 3 points between 2% and 3%; 4
points between 3% and 4%; 5 points between 4% and 5%; 6 points above 5%;
• for the variation of net worth: −2 point if variation above 10%; −1 point between
5% and 10%; 0 point between 0% and 5%; 1 point between −5% and 0%; 2
points between −10% and −5%; 3 points between −25% and −10%; 4 points
between −50% and −25%; 5 points below −50%.
Note that there are negative scores for the net worth variation if it is positive and above
5% of GDP: the idea is to take into account the mitigation potential of assets when there
is a debt problem.
The total score is then translated into a qualitative risk measure:
• no risk if score equal to or below 1;
• low risk if score equal to 2 or 3;
• medium risk if score equal to 4 or 5;
• high risk if score equal to or above 6.
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